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Abstract In rapidly ageing countries, increased life expectancies threaten the poor
and low-income workers. India is such a country. The number of people over sixty
will rise from the present 90 million to an expected 200 million by 2030. Giving
the changing demography, family structure and settlements the need for pension
products is increasing. This counts particular for women since they live longer and
have less opportunities to create a pension by lack of formal labour force partic-
ipation. This paper focuses on recent initiatives taken in India to analyze the
improvement of the pension coverage and its capacity to prevent women’s old age
poverty. How can the low pension coverage in India - in particular for low-
income female workers in the informal economy -, be increased? The research
focuses on new pension schemes introduced by the Indian Government and new
micropension provisions by grass root non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and microfinance institutes (MFIs). Results from the case-study show, that only
about 6 % of the clients of the Dhan Foundation (NGO) stated to have access to
pension. This is in line with the national statistics. The pilot initiative for a micro
pension program of the Dhan Foundation, show a clear positive result in willing-
ness to pay for micro pensions among their mostly female clientele To improve the
low coverage rate, micropensions could be of significant added value in the so
called ‘multi-pillar approach’ that recognizes the complementarities between the
state pension, the private sector and the civil society sector pension plans.
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• Analysis of new initiatives taken to prevent old age poverty in India.
• Low-income Indian women are facing an increasing financial risk of longevity and less family support.
• Low-income women in India’s informal economy are willing and able to pay for a micropension provision.
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Introduction
Ageing societies are characterized by fertility decline and increasing life expectancies,
resulting in increasing old age dependency ratios - proportion of individuals aged over
65 to those aged between 16 and 64. Developing countries like India started to
experience this only in the last 30 years. The fertility rate has declined from more than
six children on average per woman in some states, to less than two in the most
developed states of India today.
Therefore, the share of the aged (60+) in the total population in India is gradually
rising. The growth rate of the aged is more than twice as high, 3.8 %, compared to the
general population growth of 1.8 % per year (Sadak 2009). General statistics show a
share of 8.2 % aged 60+ in 2011 to 10.7 % in 2021. (Central Statistics Office Ministry
of Statistics & Programme Implementation, Government of India, 2011). Hence it is
expected that the 90 million 60+ people in India in 2011 will be more than doubled to
nearly 200 million by 2030 (UNFPA 2012). In 2050 it is projected that the 60+
population in India will be increased by 312 % (Jalal and Younis 2014). Along this
demographic transition birth rates fall due to declining child mortality, increased age of
marriage, economic development, increasing education of women (on average, an
illiterate woman in India is bearing 1.2 children more than a literate woman - 3.4
against 2.2) and access to contraception (Cutler et al. 2006).
Life expectancy of Indians at birth is 67 years for men and 73 years for women
(WHO 2013). But women who finally reach 70 years of age, will on average live
another 13 years. This gender difference in life expectancy causes a higher number of
aged women than aged men. Women’s longer life-spans compared to men, combined
with the fact that they tend to marry men older than themselves, means that the number
of widows will increase rapidly. Moreover, women face more (financial) vulnerability
due to lower literacy, lesser participation on the labor market and less customary
ownership of property. (Jamuna 2000; Rajan 2010). The World Health Organization
(WHO) warned India already that feminization of its ageing population could lead to a
rapid increase in its number of destitute widows, who need adequate resources to
support themselves for approximately another 15 years on average after the decease of
their husband and their ability to perform paid labor is often limited.
This increasing older female population urges to question the gender sensitivity of
new pension schemes introduced by the Indian Government and by NGOs and MFIs.
Are new pension provisions introduced that would reduce poverty among aged women
in the near future? This is an important aspect of our main research question: How can
the low pension coverage in India - in particular for low-income female workers in the
informal economy -, be increased?
We focus on new state initiatives, and on micro pensions. In the second part we
analyze under what conditions low-income women are willing and able to participate in
a micropension program as currently being developed by grassroots NGOs and
microfinance institutes? In this paper we focus on women with low-incomes in the
informal – also called unorganized - economy since the pension coverage is among the
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lowest in that category, however they do earn at least some income. This is unlike
among the most extreme poor, living from less than $1.25 a day, which is still one third
of the entire population in India (including children and the very old) (World Bank
2012).
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we briefly describe the changing
demography, family structure and settlements in India. In section 3 describes the most
recent trends in state pensions in India and their meaning for older women. Section 4
describes a variety of new micro pension provisions and their potential for poor aged
women. A case study in section 5 focuses on the ability and willingness of women to
pay for a micro pension program like that of the DHAN (Development of Humane
Action) Foundation, a non-governmental organization, based in Madurai, South India
(Dhan Foundation 2009). For this purpose we use a feasibility study among 400
selected female members of DHAN foundation. The original household survey covered
44.562 members of the foundation, most women. Section 6 contains conclusions and
answers the main research question.
Changing Demography, Family Structure and Urban Settlement in India
In most societies children took and still take (financial and care) responsibility for their
older parents. This intergenerational system is rapidly eroding as individualization and
modernization are entering the Indian society. The National Report on the Status of
Elderly in Select States of India (2012) of United Nations Family Planning Association
shows the main reasons why.1 This report indicates urbanization and feminization of the
older generation as main trends for eroding intergenerational family and elderly
support.
Most of the 60+ Indians today still live with their relatives, in so-called co-residence.
But urbanization of India is taking place at a faster pace than elsewhere in the world. By
2030, 40% of India’s population will be living in urban areas compared to 28% in 2007.
Young people in the rural areas migrate to urban areas and abroad, leaving often their
parents and children behind. In the rural areas more than twice asmany older women live
alone or with grandchildren than in urban areas (Rajan and Kumar 2003; NSSO 2006).
The “feminization” of the aged is the second most significant change in the ageing
scenario of India. 60 % of the older women, in contrast to 25 % of older men, are living
without a spouse.
Families shrink by lower fertility rates (women’s choice). This is a prominent
demographic transition in India as well. According to the National Family Health
Survey (International Institute for Population Sciences 2007) 86 % of the women with
two living children do not want more children. Macroeconomic research shows that
intergenerational families’ transfers from adult children to ageing parents are declining
(Pal and Palacios 2008; Alam & Institute of Economic Growth 2008). At the same time
the old age dependency ratio (less children, more aged people) increases (Alam 2004,
1 UNFPA collected primary data on the socio-economic status of the elderly, their living arrangements and
familial relationships, health, perceptions and access to social benefits. UNFPA (2012), Report on the Status of
Elderly in Select States of India, 201. Building a Knowledge Base on Population ageing in India. http://india.
unfpa.org/drive/AgingReport_2012_F.pdf
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Alam & Institute of Economic Growth 2008). Both arguments call for formal pension
systems, particular for poor women and single women (Cigno and Rosati 1992; Drèze
and Murthi 2001; Boldrin et al. 2005, Billari et al. 2008). The Indian government
realizes this and initiated new policies (Shah 2005).
State Pension Provisions
The Indian government faces rapid urbanization, breakdown of the intra family support
system, growth of nuclear families and increasing longevity. This means more poverty
risks for older people, especially for women, often widows. How does the Indian
government address these risks?
Usually pension systems in countries are categorizes in three so called pillars
according to the World Bank categorization. The first pillar refers to (federal) state
provisions, tax based, non contributory ‘social’ pensions. The second pillar is the
funded private pillar, which refers to formal labour related savings, negotiated by
employers and employees. The third pillar consists basically of savings that cover
self-employed workers in the informal economy.
Recent State Pension Initiatives (Pillar 1)
In 2007 the Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme (IGNOAPS) was
launched. This means-tested, first pillar scheme strives to provide a monthly pension
to the very poor aged 65+ and classified as living below the poverty line of $1,25 (BPL
families). In 2009 the Indira Gandhi National Widow Pension Scheme and the Indira
Gandhi National Disability Pension Scheme came into place, with comparable provi-
sions for widows and disabled, covering about 3.5 million BPL widows of 40–59 years.
Hence the IGNOAPS scheme faced mounting criticism for its small size and low
coverage. It covers only around 20 % of India’s estimated 84 million older people. The
actual pension received varies between states, with some people receiving as little as
Rs.200 (US $4) a month. In 2013 a massive protest march to New Delhi resulted within
a week in an unprecedented commitment of the Government of India: every aged 65+
would receive the Indira Ghandi National Old Age Pension Scheme (IGNOAPS).
Earlier research of the World Bank showed that in India pillar 1 pensions do cover
only about 5 % of poor older people (Pal and Palacios 2008; Asher 2007).
It is too early to answer our first question: will the above new pension schemes of
2013, introduced by the Indian Government, prevent future old age poverty of
women? With the launch of the Indira Gandhi National Widow Pension Scheme in
2009 the government responded to the feminization of older generation. However, its
implementation needs improvement in order to cover a growing number of widows.
Another category that urgently needs some pension coverage are workers –partic-
ular the large number of women- in the informal sector in India. In the informal sector
employment and income are irregular and there is no social security in case of
accidents, illnesses, or ageing. According to the latest census (2011), 346 million
people (more than 85 % of the Indian working population) work in the informal
economy. At least 120 million of them are women. Informal wage employment is
common among employees of informal enterprises; casual or day workers; temporary
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or part-time workers; paid domestic workers; unregistered or undeclared workers and
industrial out workers (home workers) (Chakrabarti 2009; Bordia and Bhardwaj 2003).
The Indian government improved social security for these categories, including the
development of new pension plans and the public information improved by means of
opening a pension portal by the government (Holzmann et al. 2009).
Job Related Pension Provisions (Pillar 2)
An interesting development in India in the context of a pillar 2 pension provision, is the
substantial government investment in the NPS-Lite scheme launched in 2010. This
pension program specifically targets the informal workforce. The government contrib-
utes financially to the savings of every NPS-lite participant and therefore it acts as an
“employer”. This NPS-Lite scheme aims at building a fund sufficient enough to buy an
annuity (continuing payment with a fixed total amount) for old age (Figs. 1 and 2).
Private Savings, Including NGOs and MFIs Pension Provisions (Pillar 3)
Pillar 3 refers to (voluntary) private savings. The provisions within this pillar are a new
playing field in many developing countries for a variety of stakeholders, policy makers
and interest groups. Also India develops a trend in this area. A long history of
communal financing, credit unions and Rosca’s (rotating credit associations), could
be seen as a forerunner for this new type of micro finance schemes and makes the
development promising (see next section). In Fig. 3 the potential market for products
within the realm of pillar 3 is outlined.
Micropensions in India
This section describes new developments in microfinance and in particular micro
pension in India and their potential combating and preventing future poverty of aged
women. Traditionally, the safest and most cost-effective way for people to improve
Fig. 1 Total Fertility Rates, India and Selected States, 1972–2009. Source: Sample registration statistical
report 2010, report nr. 1, 2012, Office of the registrar general, India Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of
India, New Delhi
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their economic position and prepare for old age, is asset accumulation (land, habitat,
property) and diversification of savings (Attanasio, Burgiavini, 2003). Low-income
workers take opportunities to invest in real assets, most common in small plots, cattle
and farmland. For women, to invest in this way, is not always an option because of
customary laws that forbid female ownership or inheritance. Therefore women often
save in gold and tradable goods. Older forms of communal financing or informal
savings are found in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCA’S) (Smets
2000). A Rosca is a group of individuals who agree to meet and save communal for a
defined period of time. Each participant gets one time the communal savings. In its
simplest form: 10 people put every week 100 Rupees in the Rosca. Every week it is
someone’s turn to get the 1000 Rupees in order to invest in their small business. In
10 weeks time every participant had her turn. Often Rosca’s are womens groups. In the
next sections we elaborate on the implementation of these ideas in microfinance.
Fig. 2 Percent distribution of economically dependent aged persons by category of persons supported by the
aged
Fig. 3 Potential client base for New Pension Scheme (NPS) - informal sector workers+unpaid family
workers+non covered formal sector employees. Source: Palacios (2011) – EPFO=Employee’s Provident
Fund Organisation
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Microfinance for Lifecycle Needs
Since the founding of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (1983), microfinance has
become a global trend (Khandker and Samad 2013). Microfinance is a general term to
describe financial services to low-income individuals or to those who do not have
access to conventional banking services. Its founder, Dr. Muhammad Yunus, started
with providing microcredit services whereby the group cohesion or ‘social capital’
formed in the lending and saving group was considered as form of social collateral. The
participants could help each other and put pressure as well. (Yunus and Jolis 1999,
Guha 2007).
Research shows that even people with a low-income can actually save (Dowla &
Barua 2006, Banerjee & Duflo 2007). Women in general save relatively more than men
do and women are better re-payers of loans. They invest more prudently, which yields
more benefit in the long run. Low-income women workers have also proven to be
“better savers”, more reliable, and more effective investors (Seibel 2005, Fujita and
Sato 2014). They are able to frequently set aside small sums of money, but often they
lack vehicles to convert these into funds large enough to support them during old age.
Microfinance institutions are willing to fill this nice with new savings and insurance
schemes, especially life insurance (Brau and Woller 2004). Brau and Woller summarize
several reasons for this popularity:
1. Growing demand for savings products because the traditional assets of women like
gold being vulnerable to loss, theft and value changes.
2. Micro Finance Institutions offer the possibility to use collected funds to finance
own credit services and in this way reduce dependence on foreign donors (that used
the MFI’s as vehicles for their development strategy).
3. Awareness of changing family structures; less or no children for financial support
at old age, children live far away or maybe abroad, women widow much more than
man, all possible risks for poverty in old age.
Microfinance for Old Age Provisions
Much has changed in India since the beginning of microcredit strategies. The rural
economy has diversified, the cash economy has expanded, the service sector has
developed, and mobility has increased. These changes gave rise to re-think financial
sector interventions, including new ways of thinking about how low-income workers,
and mothers in particular, use financial services and which kinds of services these so-
called under-served require. (Hatch, 2011)
Who made the first step in rural India to use microfinance for old age provisions?
The Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) started as early as 1993 with a
pioneer pension scheme. These women earned a living through their own small (one
person) business or in agricultural work. Under the SEWA micropension plan, these
women invested a defined sum of money on a monthly basis for a fixed rate of return,
then of 7 %. The deposit has a set tenure at the end of which the client retrieved its
principal along with the interest earned during the investment period. More than 3,000
women subscribed in 1993 to this scheme. In 2002, SEWA launched a modified
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version of this original micropension product and gained 5,700 new participants. These
clients were allowed to save as little as 30 rupees monthly. (Gianadda 2007).
A second example on the Indian subcontinent is “Grameen II” based on the original
micro pension scheme of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The scholars Dowla & Barua
(2006) researched the pioneer years of the Grameen Bank and its programs and described
the Banks’motivation for adding a new long term saving scheme (micropension scheme)
to its tradition of micro finance products. The principle is that Grameen-(female) members
mandatory participate in this Grameen II saving scheme during paying back their loans.
Gianadda (2007) and Uthira & Manohar (2009) reviewed the new savings schemes
clustered as micropension schemes. These saving schemes do not yet comprise any
compulsory annuity of the accumulated funds as are known in more developed financial
markets, due to the lack of reliable data on mortality rates of workers in the informal,
unorganized and rural economy. This lack of mortality tables is a major stumbling block to
develop appropriate micropension products (Shankar and Asher 2011). Another risk
politicians and those involved in NGOs like to stress, is the turmoil in financial markets
that can generate pension fund losses, unaffordable for the poor. Another concern is
insufficient basic knowledge of financial products. A mayor concern is the supposed high
transaction costs2 for clients because of the small amounts they deposit.3 We describe three
different co-contributed funds:
1. The Invest India Micro Pension Scheme, IIMPS
2. The Abhaya Hastham schemes
3. Dhan Foundation, partner-agent model like SEWA
Invest India Micro Pension (IIMPS) is a pension scheme for low-income, informal
sector workers. IIMPS was established in 2006 as an administrative service provider.
The company is developing a “national level micropension marketplace” through which
low-income workers will be able to channel retirement savings into the stock markets.
IIMPS advocates for targeted co-contribution by the government for low-income
groups. Basically, Micro Pension clients, mostly women, save between Rs.200 and
Rs.300 per month in a customized, integrated financial solution consisting of pension,
insurance and savings products. The revenue model of IIMPS does not differ much from
the NPS-Lite. Since inception, roughly 400,000 urban and rural low-income individuals
across nearly 100 districts of 14 States of India use the Micro-Pension model to save for
their old age. The target is to reach 5 million people before the end of 2014.
The Abhaya Hastham Co-contributory Pension is a co-contributory pension scheme
for the women of Andhra Pradesh, delivered through the financial Self Help Groups
(SHGs) 4 of SERP, a government sponsored NGO. The pension comes with some
2 Microfinance institutes aim to work more efficient, contain transaction costs by using new technology or
reduce their operating costs by finding a way of innovative substantial insurance for microfinance loan; so as
to partly shift the burden of non repayment from the poor to some third party. However further research is
needed to establish an appropriate interest rate. http://www.cgap.org/about/faq/why-do-mfis-charge-high-
interest-rates and http://www.tropentag.de/2006/abstracts/posters/58.pdf
3 Ramesh S. Arunachalam, Microfinance Consulting Group on http://www.solutionexchange-un.net.in/mf/cr/
cr-se-mf-03040701.pdf
4 A self-help group (SHG) is a village-based financial intermediary usually composed of 10–20 local women
or men. Members make small regular savings contributions until there is enough capital in the group to begin
lending.
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different features like a life insurance cover of Rs.30.000 (US$672) and a scholarship
of Rs.1,200 (US$26.89) per month for children of the clients. Until 2012 nearly 4.3
million members have enrolled for the pension scheme which is less than the expected
6 million in 2009. Though demonstrating fairly reasonable outreach, this scheme is
highly dependent on the government subsidy and is expected to be nearly self sufficient
only by the year 2045.
The partner-agent model is a scheme whereby the MFIs act as partner and one of the
state banks of India as the agent. This model delivers a win-win situation in which the
asset management company (agent) reaches the low-income market while the MFI
expands its product range. In addition, the partnership allows both institutions to focus
on their core business and expertise, the NGO on their direct relations with clients and
administration, the bank on their investment capacity (Gianadda 2007).
The UTI Retirement Benefit Pension Scheme 5 is such a partner-agent pension
scheme. More organizations like f.i Mann Deshi Bank and the Shepherd have similar
arrangements with one of India’s largest state banks.
We conclude that, based on our literature study, India is amongst the pioneers in
elaboration on micro-financing schemes with new savings products for various groups.
From a gender perspective this is positive; most participants are women with low-
incomes working in the informal economy. From a coverage perspective, these devel-
opments are just a beginning. Taking the demographic changes in consideration and the
expected feminization of the aged, there is more room for pension reforms.
Sustainability of Micro Pension Schemes
Are micro pension schemes sustainable? This is a major concern because of the dropout
of participants. Reasons for leaving are a.o: high training and administration costs; no
monthly pension statements, so clients lack trust whether the savings were actually
administrated; the information is given in English instead of the local language.
If these challenges could be addressed, more micro pension programs could have the
potential to upscale enrollment. Uthira and Manohar (2009) executed a desk research
on sustainability of micropensions in the era of pension reforms in India. They
concluded that if strategically and judiciously used, micropensions could be a sustain-
able product that will contribute to poverty alleviation. Poverty alleviation as a state
responsibility is so far partly complemented by financial Self Help Groups, NGO
initiatives and partly by MFIs.
Case Study: Micro Pension Scheme of the Dhan Foundation
In the case study below we research the question:
“Under what conditions are low-income women in the informal sector willing and
able to pay for a micropension provision as currently being developed by grassroots
NGO’s and the microfinance sector for their older female clients?”
5 UTI Retirement Benefit Pension Scheme is a pension scheme notified by the Government of India’s Gazette
Notification dated 3 Nov 2005, under Income Tax Act 1961, Sub Clause (2), Part (XIV), Section 80C
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The case study is about the new micropension scheme of the Development
of Humane Action (DHAN) Foundation, a non-governmental organization
(NGO) in Tamil Nadu, Madurai, South India. DHAN – which is Tamil for
‘giving back to society’- is working with over a million households through
different thematic programs to reduce poverty by diversifying the range of
financial assets and sharing the social economic risks. Their microfinance
program is executed by a separate entity, People Mutual, registered as a trust
under Indian Trusts Act on December 11, 2003. People Mutual is a mutual
insurance initiative promoted through collaboration between DHAN Foundation,
Oxfam Novib, Rabobank Foundation and Eureko Re insurance company, all
based in the Netherlands. People Mutual’s mission is to safeguard poor
people from risks and vulnerabilities through collaboration with insurance
providers and mutual solutions to reduce poverty. (People Mutual Annual
Report 2011).
The members of People Mutual’s already save in their financial Self Help Groups
(SHG’s) and Farmers Associations (FA’s), These SHG’s and FA’s, so called peoples’
institutions, were built on the principles of self help and mutuality aiming to address
poverty. This community banking of Peoples Mutual enables low-income families to
decide on products and services suitable for them and building appropriate systems and
operational mechanisms to sustain them.
Building on this experience, the DHAN Foundation in partnership with
WorldGranny, Pension Development Network and HelpAge India decided to pilot a
Dhan’s micro-pension program for their clients. The asset management of the
micropension product would be executed by the Life Insurance Company of India
(LIC). Before the pilot could start, a household study and a feasibility study were
conducted. The household study is conducted amongst financial self-help-
groups in 20 locations (branches). 44, 562 households were interviewed by a
pre-tested household interview. With the results of this household survey 10
locations were shortlisted for a feasibility study of which we review the results
in this paragraph. This feasibility study was executed among about 400 respon-
dents, spread over 5 age categories (<30, 31–40, 41–50, 51–60, >60). From
each of the 10 selected locations 8 members of a financial Self Help Group and
Farmers Association were interviewed, all women. The feasibility study sample of 400
is representative for the total membership of the Dhan foundation states and contexts.
This means that the 10 wealthiest locations out of 20 were chosen (see Table 1). 10
wealthiest locations are considered as those comprising the test market for the
micropension pilot of the Dhan Foundation.
Baseline Study
The baseline survey was undertaken to understand demographic composition,
occupation patterns and income levels of the target group (People Mutual,
2010). The research objective was to describe the socio economic conditions
of the aged poor and their (traditional) support mechanisms of the last decade
in rural as well as urban contexts. This baseline study was conducted in order
to determine which 10 locations could be chosen for more the more in-debt
feasibility study.
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Results of the Feasibility Study
The aim of the feasibility study is to investigate the willingness and ability of low-
income women in the informal economy to save for a micro pension product.
In the feasibility the 45–60 age category is the main age group to investigate
willingness and ability for pension schemes. This age category comprises 26 % of
the sample. The 60+ age category concerns only 3.2 % of the sample. More than half of
the women of 60+ are widowed. The respondents have an average yearly income of $
738 (40,620 Rs.). Urban locations show a higher annual income pattern (about $ 1,000
Rs. 60,000) than in rural and coastal locations (average annual income around $500
(Rs. 30,000).
On average 60+ women had 3 times less income than women aged between 31 and
40.
Pension coverage in the sample ranged from 28 % in (Mudhukulathur) to 0 % (in
Siraram). Access to existing pension schemes (state pension, pillar 1 or job pensions,
pillar 2) is low. On average only 6.0 % of the respondents (measured by location
average) had access to a kind of pension provision on national or state level.
Annual savings were on average 1347 rupees (>100 R per month) per household
($ 29). The average amount of cumulative savings (=total saving over a life time) of the
interviewed households was 8439 rupees ($ 185), in about 6 years of savings. 6
However, the value of income generating assets such as land and other assets is still
a multi fold of the annual savings per household. Households have on average total
assets of 43362 rupees ($ 953).
In the next part the demographics are related to the variables “willing to pay for a
micro pension product” and “ability to contribute”.7
The Motivation for Participating in Micropension
The central question for the case study is: Under what circumstances are the female
clients in the case study willing and able to pay premiums for a micropension product?
6 The variance between the locations is quite significant. In the location of Athun, the amount of saving per
household is 24,259.84 rupees - US $ 54, and in Kondalampatti the households savings numbered almost
threefold, with an average of US $158
7 Variables used: Progressive Age Composition, Household Annual Savings, Household Cumulative Savings,
Household Annual Income, Value of Income Generating Assets, Access to Existing Pension Schemes, Access
to Life Insurance.
Table 1 Ranking of locations by
scoring composed variables
Variable Statistics Weight
- Progressive Age Composition Median 1.5
- Household Annual Savings Median 1.0
- Household Cumulative Savings Median 1.0
- Household Annual Income Median 0.5
- Value of Income Generating Assets Median 0.5
- Access to Existing Pension Schemes Median 2.0
- Access to Life Insurance Median 1.0
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Several approaches to measure willingness-to-pay have been presented in academic
literature. Breitner et al. (2006) provide a systematic overview on these competing
approaches. This is important because different studies have shown that minor varia-
tions of prices and the corresponding consumer behavior can have notable effects on
revenues and profits. For long-term products like micropensions this is of even more
importance in order for individuals to establish their proper returns.
In the case study, the respondents are not asked for their actual reasons to pay, just
whether they would be willing to pay. In every age group we found a gap between the
perceived financial needs in old age and the perceived availability (see Table 2). The
gap increases per age group, for the 30–45 it is 13 %, for the 60+ the assumed gap
between actual and needed income is about 60 % .
Regardless of age category, the overall majority of respondents (90 % or more)
expressed the need for a micropension. There was no relationship between the size of
the assumed income gap (actual and needed income) and respondents’ opinion on
needing a micro pension. Only those who expressed no need for a micro pension
showed some variety in age groups. This showed a relation with the size of the assumed
income gap. The age groups with the smallest assumed gap answer a little more often
with “no need for micro pension”. A possible explanation is the amount of savings or
assets that can be used as old age provisions.
In general we see that the younger generation is more willing to pay for micro
pensions because they no longer expect much financial family support once they
become aged.
The gap between needed and received money is the highest in the >60 years
category (Table 2). On the other hand, the expected benefits of the respondents
(Table 3) are higher than the need (Table 2). The main reason why the 45–60 age
category is willing to pay for a micropension is because of the very low pension
coverage in pillar 1 and because they have no access to job related pensions (pillar 2).
For this category micro pension scheme like of Dhan Foundation is at least a possibil-
ity, although not yet attractive enough to invest their savings from their savings account
with the Self Help Group/Farmers’ association (Table 4)
Our respondents were not only asked about their “willingness to pay” for a micro
pension, but were also asked if they were ‘willing to use their current savings’ for it’
(Table 4).
With respect to Tables 4, 5 and 6 we notice that a vast majority of the respondents is
willing to pay for a micro pension. However, most of them are hesitant to use their
Table 2 Financial needs of individuals versus availability
>60 years 51–60 years 41–50 years 31–40 years <=30 years
Money required per month (Rs.) 1,095.0 1,011.2 692.50 799.38 749.38
Money got different sources for
spending (Rs.)
473.50 605.00 555.63 706.88 660.94
Unmet amount (Rs.) 621.50 406.25 136.88 92.50 88.44
The need is calculated as the perceived amount required as minimum living standard and the amount received.
The willingness to participate in a micropension program is taken as the expressed preparedness to join a
potential pension program
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current savings for the new micropension product. With this product the liquidity is
much less. Younger respondents are even more reluctant, most probably because of
other life-cycle needs. The liquidity of normal savings compared to a pension scheme is
more attractive for younger people. This is an important condition to cope with as
NGO’s of MFI’s.
Coming back to the average savings of 100 rupees per month it is interesting to see
that this amount is more or less the same regardless of income levels. The average
annual savings in all locations is close to 100 rupees, as well in case of rural and coastal
locations with average annual income around 30,000 rupees, as in urban locations with
incomes around 60,000 rupees per year. This standard 100 rupees saving is remarkable
the same amount as other micropensions schemes require as a monthly minimum, like
NPS, Shepherd, Mann Deshi Bank and ASA –Activists for Social Alternatives
Trichirapalli.
The difference has to do with the asset value in rural areas which is still usually
higher than in the urban and coastal areas. In rural areas ownership of land and
livestock assets are major source of livelihoods and savings for old age.
Combining these data on savings with the need and ability, it suggests that younger
respondents would be more eager to participate in a micropension program, since they
do not have to transfer their accumulated savings in a pension scheme. This is one of
the conditions for low-income women to save for a micropension.
Respondents report a high dependency for personal financial needs in every age
group. The respondents of >60 group are for 72.5 % to be financially depending on
themselves or others. In the age category 41–50 the dependency is somewhat lower,
probably due to own income out of labour.
These data are similar to those figures presented in the report from the Indian
Government (see Fig. 2) with this difference that a larger percentage of older people
is dependent on the children with respect to a lesser percentage on spouses. The average
opinion on the family support is positive, though it diminishes during the life-cycle.
Table 3 The need for a micropensions (per cent)
Opinion about the need
for micropension
>60 years 51–60
years– years
41–50 years 31–40 years <=30 years
Yes, I need 93.75 91.25 90.00 90.00 91.25
No, I don’t need 1.25 3.75 10.00 7.50 8.75
I can’t say 5.00 5.00 – 2.50 –
Table 4 Pension benefits expected
per month (rupees)
Stratum Amount
>60 years 841.88
51–60 years 1,265.00
41–50 years 1,241.25
31–40 years 1,733.75
<=30 years 1,903.75
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This is also in line with the research of a.o. Alam (2004, Alam & Institute of Economic
Growth 2008) and implies the need for financial self reliance for women in later life.
Conclusions
The main question in this paper was:
How can the low pension coverage in India - in particular for low-income female
workers in the informal economy -, be increased?
1. State initiatives
Looking at the new social security programs for the ageing low-income women in
India, there are positive developments emerging in all 3 pillars of the social security
system; governmental, job related schemes and in the realm of private/micro pension
systems. The feminization of the ageing population could lead to a rapid increase in its
number of widows living in poverty. Our question whether the new pension schemes
introduced by the Indian Government will reduce old age poverty, can be answered
positively. Though the state is actually participating in private microfinance initiatives
that are mainly geared to women, this does not mean that the gender-specificity of the
demographic transition is fully addressed. India is half way the demographic transition,
which is expected to be finished only at the end of the 21th century. India’s population
will still increase with about 60 % during the 21th century. Therefore India’s old age
dependency rate is still much smaller than in developed countries, but is growing
quickly. According to World Bank only about 5 % of older Indians have access to a
pension provision. 6 % of the Dhan-clients stated to have access to pension. India has
governmental pension provisions (pillar I) and job related pensions (pillar II). These are
insufficient especially for low-income workers in the unorganized sector where most
women earn their income.
Table 5 Willingness to pay pre-
mium (Rupees)
Stratum Amount (Month) in Rs. Amount (year) in Rs.
>60 years 74.19 890
51–60 years 94.31 1131
41–50 years 98.44 1181
31–40 years 91.50 1098
<=30 years 113.75 1365
Table 6 Willingness to use savings in SHG/FA as a lump sum premium payment towards micro-pension
(percent)
Willingness >60 years 51–60years 41–50 years 31–40 years <=30 years
Yes, I am willing 58.75 45.0 42.5 33.75 36.25
No, I am not 27.5 36.25 45.0 52.5 53.75
I can’t say 13.75 18.75 12.5 13.75 10.0
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2. Micropensions
The Government executed Invest India Income and Savings Survey 20078 indicated
that approximately 61 million low-income unorganized workers are interested to save
for retirement, and nearly 25.8 million of them can afford (and are willing) to pay
Rs.2.300 ($ 51.56) per year for a private contributory pension scheme. This is 42.30 %
of low-income workers.
In 2010, the Indian national government initiated an interesting policy of funding
micro financing schemes in order to stimulate the unorganized sector workers to save.
Microfinance institutes (MFIs) investigated the chance for developing micro pension
products as a way to increase pension coverage. The micropension schemes offered in
India are amongst the pioneers, like the most recent program of the Dhan-Foundation.
3. Feasibility study
In the second part we analyzed under what conditions low-income women were
willing and able to participate in a micropension program as currently being developed
by grassroots NGOs and microfinance institutes. The results of this case- study lead to
the following conclusions:
& The need for micropension is perceived in all the age groups. The gap between
money required and money received is higher for people aged >60. The expected
pension benefits (Table 7) by the respondents are higher than the financial need
(Table 2).
& There is a common reluctance among this female respondent group to move
savings already invested in the savings program of the Self Help Group (SHG/
Farmers association) towards premium for micropension. Maybe because the
micropension scheme is a long term saving schemes and therefore sets restrictions
to the liquidity. This result is comparative with other research showing also less
likelihood for long term financial liabilities for people facing life cycle costs, like
healthcare, education and even wedding expenses (Hatch 2011).
8 This survey is supposed to be the most comprehensive pan-India market research ever produced on the
financial capabilities, preferences, behaviour and outlook of India’s mass market for retail finance, insurance
and retirement products. www.cafral.org.in/docs/Renuka%20Sane%20%20Round%20Table%20Discussion%
20Measuring%20financial%20inclusion%20from%20demand%20side.pdf
Table 7 Dependence for personal financial needs (per cent)
Dependence >60 years 51–60 years 41–50 years 31–40 years <=30 years
Own 27.50 32.50 40.00 38.75 37.50
Spouse 26.25 37.50 50.00 58.75 58.75
Other family members 35.00 23.75 6.25 1.25 3.75
Friends, relatives and other
external sources
10.25 6.25 3.75 1.25 –
Dependancy 72.50 67.50 60 61.25 62.50
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& Almost three quarters of the respondents (women) are dependent on family for
financial needs.
The feasibility study of the Dhan Foundation shows that 74 % is willing to pay a
premium for micropension provisions (in all age categories except for aged >60). That
is about twice as much as in the earlier governmental survey of 2007 (see Table 6).
Most probably this has to do with the gender aspect. Other researchers (Palacios 2011)
show that women are far more likely to join a pension scheme; that income positively
correlates with willingness to join; that the married are more likely to participate; that
landholders are less likely and that there is a high correlation with insurance coverage.
The Dhan respondents are almost all women and have quite some financial awareness,
due to their membership of the Dhan foundation. Our sample is probably also a
somewhat higher segment of the low-income unorganized workers then in the govern-
mental survey of 2007 (Kannan and Papola 2007). But it could also be another
indication that since 2007 longevity awareness further increased and therewith the
readiness to pay premiums for micropension provisions.
The pension coverage by direct governmental provisions is still low (1st pillar).
This is also the case for pension coverage by job related provisions and hybrid
schemes like NPS and (though to a lesser extent) NPS-lite (2nd & 3rd pillar). Our
research on the Dhan-foundation data show the increasing readiness for 3rd pillar
provisions like micropension schemes, particular among one of the most difficult
population groups in this respect in India, the low-income unorganized workers, in
particular women. Our findings among this female respondent group with relatively
higher financial awareness supplement those of others and give insight in opinions
of an actual local situation.
In this research, we did not pay attention to the flexibility of payments by women
working in the informal sector. They have a small and irregular income. Flexibility
of contributions encourages contribution of small but frequent amounts resulting
not only to lesser contributions but also high transaction costs and consequently low
benefit payouts. Voluntary contributions meant to encourage enrolments result to
the participants not prioritizing pension contribution; high enrolment lowers ad-
ministrative costs but results to diseconomies of scale in the long run and saving for
the future minimizes old age poverty but lowers the amounts available for con-
sumption today especially given that informal sector participants do not have
enough means for today (Njuguna, 2012). It would be interesting, as a point of
attention for future research, to pay attention to the options of daily, weekly or
Table 8 Opinion about support of other family members
Opinion >60 years 51–60 years 41–50 years 31–40 years <=30 years
Excellent 47.50 58.75 65.00 71.25 68.75
Satisfactory 18.75 28.75 26.25 23.75 28.75
Not satisfied: feel lonely 28.75 11.25 6.25 5.00 2.50
Can’t say 5.00 1.25 2.5 –
The respondents are asked about their opinion without family members present to prevent a positive bias
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monthly payments to the scheme in relation to the costs-structure and efficiency of
the total scheme and whether this is beneficial to low-income participants. The
results could of added value for a multi-trajectory (pillars) approach in social
security policies for India as the road to wider pension coverage in the informal
economy (Table 8).
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Annex
Table 9 Household Annual Income
SI. No. Locations State Programme Context Annual
Income
1 Thiramangalam (RFDT) TN RFDT Rural 53,000
2 Mudhukulathur (Tank) TN TANK Rural 30,000
3 Thiruppathi AP KCBP Urban 72,000
4 Chittoor AP KCBP Rural 42,000
5 Kuppam AP KCBP Rural 50,400
6 Shanti Nagar AP KCBP Urban 36,000
7 Mgadi KA KCBP Rural 36,000
8 Bannur KA KCBP Rural 24,000
9 Sellur TN KCBP Urban 60,000
10 Sanarpatti TN KCBP Rural 36,000
11 Mullai TN KCBP Rural 30,000
12 Sirpam TN CALL Coastal 24,000
13 Sangamam TN CALL Coastal 36,000
14 Sigaram TN CALL Coastal 26,000
15 Ponnammapettai TN KCBP Urban 60,000
16 Athoor TN KCBP Rural 48,000
17 Kondalampatti TN KCBP Urban 50,000
18 Veerapandi TN KCBP Rural 36,000
19 Periyakulam TN KCBP Rural 33,000
20 Pudhucherry PY CALL Coastal 30,000
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